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reflectiveness suspends and re-directs organic life, a theory of the interplay of these
ontological realms is possible and necessary, but not in the direction marked by these
authors.
ANGEL MEDINA
Georgia State University
KAREEN MALONE
Duquesne University

W i l l i a m Barrett, The Illusion of Technique: A Search for Meaning in a
Technological Civilizatian. G a r d e n City, N e w Y o r k : A n c h o r P r e s s / D o u b l e day, 1978. xx ~+ 359 pp. $12.95.
By now Barrett's book has been reviewed in nearly twenty popular and learned periodicals. 1 Apparently Barrett has the attention of the larger intellectual community in this
country. In this regard he belongs to a very small group of contemporary American
philosophers which is comprised of such thinkers as Hannah Arendt, Thomas Kuhn,
Herbert Marcuse, and John Rawls. 2 Barrett's thought does not have the seminal force
of his well-known colleagues. Still the tone of most of the reviews shows that Barrett
enjoys not only attention but also respect. It is noteworthy, however, that the reviews
that have been written by noted colleagues of Barrett's show some reserve and
occasionally Scorn.3 That suggests that Barrett's book is of interest not only for the
sake of its theses and arguments but also as a focus of the question how contemporary
American philosophy is related to the intellectual character and direction of this
country.
The title of the book which seems to promise an essay in the philosophy of technology may be misleading since the avowed purpose of the book is to present % study
of contemporary philosophy" (xvi) which is at the same time "an attempt at a
connected argument for freedom" (xvii).* Barrett has chosen Wittgenstein, Heidegger,
and James as representatives of contemporary philosophy, and in this choice he is
remarkably close to a colleague of a very different temperament, Richard Rorty, who
calls Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Dewey "the richest and most original philosophers
of our time. ''5
Let me begin with a brief survey of Barrett's presentations. The book is divided
into four parts. The first, entitled "Technique," begins with a chapter that sets forth
the origin and dissolution of "The Illusion of a Technique," i.e., the rise of symbolic
logic and its application as a technique for solving all philosophical problems. Barrett
points to the diverging developments of the founding fathers of this project, Russell,
Whitehead, and Wittgenstein, as evidence of the failure of this technique. This leads
in the second chapter to general remarks about "Technique, Technicians, and
Philosophy." Technique is first defined as ritual and then, in the modern case, said
to be assimilated by technology. "Technology is embodied technique." (I8) The tie
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to logic is established by calling a machine "an embodied decision procedure" (20).
The relation of technique and technology to philosophy is twofold. Technology on
the one side "is the late, and maybe the final offspring of philosophy" (22). On the
other, philosophy despite the failure of technique outlined in chapter one remains in
the thrall of technique. The lesson has not been learned and requires further consideration. Chapter three therefore gives an exposition of the Tractatus and argues that the
claim made for logic (that it mirrors the structure of the world) is unfounded and
that the atomism to which the Tractatus is committed must lead to a denial of genuine
freedom. But as the fourth chapter points out, "Mysticism" is as much part of the
Tractatus as logic and rigor, though silence is all that Wittgenstein suggests as a
response to the mystical side of the world. The later Wittgenstein breaks through the
confines of the Traclatus and acknowledges "Open Language" though he still remains
bound to simple and austere aspects of the world and sheds little light on the problem
of freedom as chapter five presents it. In the sixth chapter, "Mathematics, Mechanism,
and Creativity," Barrett proceeds to Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics. He
argues that Russell's attempt to reduce mathematics to logic was misconceived and
failed. G6del's theorem and similar ones show "that human creativity exceeds any
mechanism in whi:h it might seek to contain its own constructs" (93)- Wittgenstein
recognized the openness of mathematics and suggested that it be looked at as a network
of human norms and conventions though he fails to ask what should determine these
conventions.
The arguments so far, Barrett says, have shown the inherent limitations of technique.
He now proceeds to place technique as embodied in technology in the context of
"Being," the title of part two. In chapter seven, Barrett departs from "The Two
Worlds," the one disclosed by science, the other the one we live in and experience.
Descartes is said to have established the diremption of the two worlds for the modern
era. Husserl tried to reestablish the unity of the world by exploring the intentional
acts through which things come to be present. But holding to the division of essence
and existence and making consciousness the highest court of appeal, Husserl bars
himself from being and from the force of existence as it thrusts itself upon consciousness. Chapter eight, "Homeless in the World," develops its topic by presenting a
discussion and close illustrations of the notions of being-in-the-world, truth, and being
as put forward in Heidegger's Being and Time. "The Cash Value of Being" is argued
in chapter nine by pointing up how in Wittgenstein's and Heidegger's treatment of
language being is at issue. Chapter ten outlines modern history of philosophy as the
prelude and institution of "Technology as Human Destiny." In the final chapter of
part two, "Utopia or Oblivion," Barrett urges that the metaphysics of technology is
enacted and accepted in everyday life as is the radical subjectivity which is part of
that metaphysics.
Part three, entitled "Freedom," begins in chapter twelve with the argument that
"The Moral Will" and religion are at the center of a personality and that Heidegger
in spite of his reflections on freedom and death was unable to reach that center.
Chapter thirteen introduces James as the thinker who asserts the freedom of the will
and is willing to acknowledge the force of religion. Yet James, as chapter fourteen
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indicates, never speaks from within "The Faith to Will," i.e., from the experience
of the advent of faith. The final part of the book turns to the question of "The Shape
of the Future ?" It begins with "The Shape of the Future: American Version"
(chapter fifteen). Barrett sees its outlines in B. F. Skinner's writings, Walden Two
in particular. He finds Skinner's determinism erroneous and perhaps morally debilitating. Chapter sixteen, "The Shape of the Future : Russian Version," argues that the
Marxist analysis of society and its prediction of the rise of a classless society have
been reduced to absurdity by the developments in Russia since the revolution. The
book concludes with an Epilogue, "Nihilism, Faith, Freedom," in which Barrett
testifies to his pra:tice of faith in the gesture of crossing himself and to his discovery
of tranquillity in the contemplation of nature.
Barrett's systematic concern is with technique and freedom; his historical concern
is with Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and James. These concerns are interwoven, of course;
but an initial division will be helpful for the critical part of this review. Technique
is first introduced and defined by Barrett in connection with logic and mathematics.
Technique in this case is the attempt to reduce (areas of) mathematics, language, and
philosophical problems to axiomatic systems. G(Jdel and others have shown that this
enterpr.;se has inherent limitations in regard to certain formal systems. From this
generally accepted fact Barrett draws two conclusions. First, G6del's result is evidence
for human freedom. To appreciate Barrett's position one must look at his procedure.
Barrett throughout his book converses with the great figures of modern and
contemporary philosophy. But he quite ignores or is ignorant of the details of the
philosophical discussions that are now going on in this country or elsewhere. His
sweeping dismissals of contemporary philosophy are therefore unconvincing (i2, 23-24,
i7i, 215). What is more disturbing is the fact that he repeatedly rests his case on
arguments or theses which appear doubtful, to say the least, in light of present
controversies. Serious objections have, e.g., been raised against the claim that G6del's
theorem shows that man is more than a me:hanism. 6
Barrett's second conclusion says that technique has inherent limitations. But what
is technique, generally speaking ? In the chapter that begins with the question "What
is a te:hnique ?'" Barrett starts with the general notion of technique as ritual, then
restricts it is the modern case by saying that technique is here absorbed by technology.
Technology seems to be the ensemble of machines that surrounds us. The logical
essence of the machine, in turn, lies in its being "an embodied decision procedure." The
point is suggestive, but it remains vague. In what sense is a machine an embodied
decis'on procedure ? "When your car starts up in the morning, it is solving a problem
by going through a number of prescribed steps," Barrett says (2o). The point that
he seems to emphasize is that one certain input will always result in one certain
output. One can certainly think of an embodied decision procedure as an input-outputsystem. But unlike a motor that is being started, such a system accepts and produces
infinitely many different inputs and outputs of a certain sort. There are also machines,
embodying negative feedback loops, which produce one and the same output in
response to different inputs of a certain kind. Does Barrett want to exclude those ?
Or does he merely want to say that machines are problem solvers ? Then how do they

Book reviews

461

differ from plants and animals ? Or from lakes considered as thermal systems ? Again
there is a large body of contempora~7 writings on the topic under the titles of
functionalism and systems theory.7 It has not left a trace in Barrett's book. Presumably
it belongs to the "so-called technical publications of philosophy" where the philosopher
"immerses himself in hair-splitting debates" (23). Yet along with the sterility of
much of technical philosophy Barrett dismisses features which would be necessary to
give his theses force : rigor and coherence. Rorty who also considers much of modern
and contemporary philosophy fruitless, has furnished many pages of closely reasoned
arguments to establish his claim. Barrett sometimes assures us that he could provide
details and evidence for his grand theses (I98, 2r6). But his book contains no
sustained argument in support of a controversial or original point that would extend
over more than two pages.
Two of the four parts of the book end with conclusions which apparently are
intended to bring the direction and force of the foregoing chapters into relief, s They
illustrate the shortcomings of Barrett's style. The "Conclusion to Part I" advances the
relation between freedom and techniques as the governing concern of the book.
Immediately the problem of the technology of behavior and the claims made by its
proponents are brought up. This is followed by % small story" of a page and a half
that "may be to the point" ( i o i ) . After two pages of various comments on behaviorism, Barrett says: "The Business of conditioning people, however, has been a
subsidiary issue in this first section." (Io5) In fact it has hardly been an issue at alI.
The "Conclusion" then comes quickly to an end when Barrett announces that in the
next part technique will be cons'tiered in a broader context (IO5-6).
In the "Conclusion to Part II," Barrett acknowledges that the first two parts are at
odds with one another since the first claims that technique has inherent limitations
whereas the second argues that the technical order "seems to brook no inherent
limitations to technique" (222). The inconsistency is not as stark as it might seem.
Even if one were to accept the theses of part one, they would not yield anything like
a clear and fruitful paradigm of technique which could be applied to and tested
against the social order. And it is not really true that "Part II has dealt with
technique as it is factually and concretely embodied in our actual technology," as
Barrett claims. Part two consists of the usual sequence of aphorisms, stories, and
sketches only one of which intermittently gives an account of a concrete situation
(z35-54). Still, to the extent that the first two parts have a discernible direction of
arguments, there is the inconsistency that Barrett notes. But if one expects the
"Conclusion to Part II" to resolve the inconsistency or to set the stage for a resolution
in a later part, he will be disappointed. Barrett at once gets diverted into an elaboration
of the second conjunct of the contradiction. This leads to a discussion of Heidegger's
method of analyzing the framework of technology. Barrett then notes that the framework is threatened by nuclear destruction and that it is a moral question whether or
not that danger is met. But Heidegger's thought does not enter the realm of ethics and
religion according to Barrett. This prompts the turn to James. The book gives an
appearance of connectedness because the end of a chapter as a rule takes explicit note
of the title and beginning of the following chapter. But the materials within each
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chapter are loosely assembled.
Barrett's other and chief systematic theme is freedom. He defends human freedom
against all endeavors to coerce and enslave man and urges that he be provided with
the fullest opportunities to develop his abilities. So far Barrett is clearly in accord with
all philosophers and social scientists in this country if not in the world. The crucial
philosophical question is whether the theoretical underpinnings of the practical
program require a notion of free action understood as uncaused action. Barrett clearly
thinks so and he is partly aware that the determinist does not. But to an important
side of the determinist position he is often blind. Barrett draws support for his
libertarian view from alleged practical differences with the determinist. Barrett, so he
says, wants the individual to flourish whereas the determinist debilitates, deceives,
and wants to coerce him (xv, IIS, 297, 3o2, 3o8). If coercion means forcible or
punitive action, one will nowhere find support for it in Skinner's writings. The
determinist does not want to fight or repress freedom. His point is rather that there
simply is no such thing as freedom if by that we mean the ability to act against or
independently of causal determination. What the determinists fight against is the
persistent illusion of freedom as uncausedness. Some do it because they think this
illusion bespeaks a theoretical confusion, others do it because they believe the illusion
to be practically pernicious. And among the latter, Skinner is one of the most vocal.
One must remember however that there is a large area of agreement between
libertarians and determinists about important practical matters such as social justice,
the police powers of the state, foreign policy, the arms race, and others. And in most
cases where there is disagreement, it is not in any strict sense traceable to different
views on freedom and determinism. The determinist would explain his large practical
agreement with the libertarian by arguing that most libertarian views and programs
are deterministically reconstructed rather than dissolved or refuted. There is of course
controversy also about the limits and the practical force of such reconstructions. But
the controversy can be fruitfully entered and advanced only if one is ready to undertake the necessary conceptual and theoretical analyses. When Barrett attempts this,
he acts as though certain theses against determinism need only be stated and illustrated
to be incontrovertible, e.g., the thesis that the "determinist has secured an unassailable
position for himself at the expense of making it empty" (26o) or the thesis that the
determinist must somewhere presuppose a free, i.e., undetermined choice (299-300).
Having thus convicted the determinist in general and Skinner in particular, he feels
entitled to claim that it "is surely harmful, particularly in the present climate of
opinion, to deprive people altogether of the notion of moral autonomy" (302) and
to brand the behavioral scientist's attitude as "callous cynicism" (308). But to one
who is familiar with the philosophical debates about freedom and determinism Barrett's arguments must seem naive, ineffective, and merely rhetorical.
I now turn to Barrett's discussion of Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and James. On Wittgenstein, Barrett presents the standard view of the turn from the Tractatus to the
Investigations. He takes note also of Wittgenstein's writings on mathematics, but I
am not competent to put Barrett's discussion in the context of the philosophy of
mathematics. And, perhaps most distinctively, Barrett draws on the personal back-
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ground and circumstances of Wittgenstein's life to reveal in his writings the work
of a "modern" whose life is a point of convergence of the conflicts of modernism
(~4). Heidegger is the most prominent thinker in Barrett's book. From him Barrett
adopts three positions. The first is the view of history as a conversation among the
great thinkers and of the thoughts so articulated as a circumscription of an epoch and
a prefiguration of what is eventually acted out in practice. The second is the claim
that the unacknowledged but always decisive theme of the epochal conversations is
being. Third, Barrett like Heidegger, sees technology as the shape that being has taken
on in the modern era.
The first of these positions is the least conspicuous. Barrett gives a sketch of
Heidegger's position (2o3-4), but he makes no issue of his adoption of that position
(though he is usually very explicit about his relation to Heidegger and others). It is
also the most pervasive and consequential attitude since it gives the book its temperament. I will come back to it. Regarding the second point, I think Barrett, claiming
that Heidegger was intent "on the single theme of Being" (242), misjudges the
significance of being in Heidegger's thought. Being in Being and Time is best understood as the watchword of a call to radical philosophizing, and being in this sense
surely has disclosive power. But what is disclosed in the pursuit of being remains
ambiguous. This is borne out by the passage in chapter eight where Barrett presents
the course of a day in the conceptual framework (the existentialia) of Being and Time
(I35-54). The result is inconclusive. The application of Being and Time to everyday
matters often amounts to nothing more than the addition of a rhetorical exclamation
mark to the trivial, ambiguous, or banal. Barrett himself remarks on the incompleteness
of Heidegger's analyses of human existence. "Dasein has no soul," he says (234). But
this intuition is not tested and worked out. I am not sure it is enough for a philosopher
to leave it at that, conceding that "even now I find no more concise and compelling
way in which to put my judgment" (234). 'Being' remained a questionable vocable for
Heidegger throughout his career. He went from one spelling (Sein) to another (Seyn)9
He crossed the word out. Io Finally he remarked : " . . . I do not like to use the word
anymore . . . " I1 This is more than a fine point of doxography. The word 'being'
became dispensable as the enterprise of Heidegger's thought turned from radicality to
simplicity, to the concreteness of such essays as "The Thing" or "Building, Dwelling,
Thinking." x2 In Barrett's use, 'being' is opaque. He uses the term to castigate philosophers and ordinary folk who are concerned merely with beings (xix, W5, ,83, 291).
But what precisely is being neglected by such people remains as clouded as the
meaning of being itself. To be sure, in the last essay that Heidegger published, it
seems, as the title "Time and Being" suggests, that he takes up again the question of
being. Is But the concern of the essay is with what gives time and being. Here the
question of God arises, x~ And it does so in a much more systematic and central way
than in the asides of Heidegger's that Barrett considers (244-45). The question of
God had to be close to Heidegger whose attachment to the tradition in which he grew
up is well-known. That tradition was thoroughly Christian. And there are enough
documents to show how Heidegger slowly found his way back into the vicinity of that
tradition. Is As Barrett tells us, he has been through Being and Time many times
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(233). But of the later Heidegger he seems to have a fragmentary knowledge only
and none, it appears, of the secondary material which throws light on the religious
dimension of the later He~degger's thought.
Finally, Barrett often states and makes use of I-Ieidegger's thesis that technology
is today's dominant character of reality (xiii, 8, 177-219). But he does nothing to
discuss and resolve the liabilities of that view, and he finally discards it when he notes
the danger of a nuclear catastrophe as evidence of the primacy of politics and ethics
over technology as understood by FIeidegger (233-24). But in so doing Barrett surely
misses Heidegger's understanding of technology. Heidegger says expressly that
technology is much more uncanny and perilous than the danger of a nuclear catastrophe. 1~ Heidegger may be wrong; but his point should not be ignored.
The least one would learn from Heidegger (and not from him alone) is that in a
technological age the questions of politics, morality, and religion must be raised in a
new way if they are to be raised fruitfully. But Barrett turns to these questions in a
traditional and abstract and finally inconsequential way. I have mentioned the bald
transition that Barrett makes from the problem of technology by way of politics to
that of morality. Having arrived at the moral issue, Barrett has little more to offer
than the insistence that "the moral will is the center of the personality" (233). He
then escalates what he mockingly calls the odd, simpleminded, tame, prosaic, stodgy,
hackneyed, and old-hat character of this position to the status of the great and saving
simplicity of our age (245-46). And finally, although he has made so much of the
simplicity of this position and of Kant's influence in establishing it, he urges that we
"have to burrow into the foundations that Kant, unknown to himself, really took for
granted" (246). What in fact follows is another quick transition from morality to
God, faith, and James (246-47).
James is repeatedly said to have a crucial place in the book because "his bold
adventure into religious belief" gives us access to an area that remains closed to
Wittgenstein and Heidegger (xvii; cf. ix-xx and 247). Yet finally Barrett admits that
James "never speaks from within faith" (272). He questions the helpfulness of
James' findings (274) and argues that James misunderstands the mystic dimension of
faith (288-94). The discussion of James turns out to be pointless.
But do not all these criticisms press Barrett's thought into the professional mold
that he is at pains to explode ? And does not the wide and respectful reception of
the book show that it is illuminating beyond the power and limits of most professional
philosophizing in this country ? I think it is at least true that Barrett's book aspires
to a concreteness, versatility, sparkle, and largeness of vision that set it off favorably
against the work of most of his colleagues. Perhaps the need for such philosophizing
is so great that even a book that professes but falls below these aspirations is well
received. I am not sure, however, that The Illusion of Technique will leave an imprint
on the spiritual and intellectual development in this country or anywhere else. Its
reception has been largely respectful, but the respect has the character of a mild and
vague approval. No one seems to be profoundly struck, disquieted, enlightened, or
encouraged. A philosophical book of real consequence will have to manifest the rigor
and resourcefulness that come to fruition when one tests and elaborates his intuitions
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against the work of his colleagues as for instance Rawls did in his Theory of Justice.
If one thinks of such professional work as sterile and distracting, his attitude should
be warranted by a vision as incisive and fruitful as for instance Heidegger's. Barrett
speaks courageously of his religious practice and of the strength he draws from the
commerce with nature (x54, 276-79, 337-40, 345). But as far as they go, these
professions seem impotent and inconsequential in the face of technology.
ALBERT BORGMANN
University of Montana
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